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LABOR AND THE SUPPLY OF VIOLATIONS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Though many students and college sports fans tend to reject the notion, most 
economists agree: the NCAA is an incidental cartel. This paper examines two 
of the more fascinating features of cartels: the necessity of agreements to earn 
monopsony rents and the tendency to cheat on the agreements.  Although it 
might be traditional to observe the NCAA's behavior from the point of view of 
standard neoclassical optimizing models (i.e., the NCAA is a firm producing 
sports entertainment from a set of inputs in such a way as to maximize profits), 
following Becker1 and Ehrlich,2 another framework for observation  
incorporates theories of criminal behavior.3  Within this framework, violations 
are committed to maximize winning percentages (and economic rents) from  
increased cartel profits.  In this way, a supply of violations is generated in  
addition to a supply of output. This paper develops a theoretical framework for 
the supply of violations in the NCAA and the demand for student-athlete (S/A) 
labor.  It utilizes a reciprocal demand model to illustrate the willingness of 
NCAA member schools to exchange rules violations for high-quality S/A  
labor.4   
                                                          
* Assistant Professor (Visiting) at Pomona College, where she currently teaches Economics of 
Crime, Economics of Sport, Industrial Organization, and Principles of Microeconomics. She earned her 
Ph.D. from Oklahoma State University after graduating from the University of California Riverside 
with an MA in Financial Economics. 
1. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 169–217 
(1968). 
2. Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 
81 J. POL. ECON. 521, 521–65 (1973).   
3. Both Becker and Ehrlich adopted a “rational” approach to crime in their models.  These models 
emphasize the benefits and costs of both legal and illegal activities.  Id. at 559–61; Becker, supra note 
1, at 207. 
4. This approach uses an adapted version of John Stuart Mill’s reciprocal demand model (as  
interpreted graphically by Edgeworth and Marshall).  See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY: WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 593 (Sir William 
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II. LITERATURE 
 The NCAA is a monopsonist in the input market and colludes in the  
output market. A sizeable literature on the self-monitoring behavior of cartels 
helps frame the current approach. Koch defined the input market in an athletic 
environment quite clearly when he recognized the power the NCAA developed 
to legislate, execute, and maintain judicial functions over member schools.5  All 
of the above behavior was typical of any cartel according to Koch.6  He  
describes the member college as a firm, describes games played between it and 
rival teams as output, and considers the university a multiproduct firm with  
differentiated products.7  The inputs used in the process are partial monopoly 
owners of talent who sell their labor to partial monopsonists.  Accordingly, it is 
the availability of alternatives to non-athletic activities that creates negotiating 
power for the S/A.  This power enables him or her to earn positive rent. 
 Kahn explored cartel behavior and amateurism in college sports.8   
He concludes, “[C]ollege sports programs . . . extract rents from  
revenue-producing athletes by limiting their pay and requiring [amateur  
status].”9 A variety of legal challenges to amateurism have failed—most notably 
the recent decision by the National Labor Relations Board to not rule on the 
National College  Players Association petition to unionize on behalf of  
Northwestern University football players.10 Estimates of marginal revenue 
                                                          
Ashley ed., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1973) (1909).  Mill’s model was applied to international 
trade.  He explains:  
 
But all trade, either between nations or individuals, is an interchange of commodities, 
in which the things that they respectively have to sell constitute also their means of 
purchase: the supply brought by the one constitutes his demand for what is brought 
by the other.  So that supply and demand are but another expression for reciprocal 
demand: and to say that value will adjust itself so as to equalize demand with supply, 
is in fact to say that it will adjust itself so as to equalize the demand on one side with 
the demand on the other. 
 
Id. 
5. James V. Koch, The Economics of “Big-Time” Intercollegiate Athletics, 52 SOC. SCI. Q. 248, 
248 (1971). 
6. Id. at 249. 
7. Id. at 250. 
8. Lawrence M. Kahn, Markets: Cartel Behavior and Amateurism in College Sports, 21 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 209, 209–26 (2007). 
9. Id. at 224. 
10. Football players, led by Kain Colter, sought to be recognized as employees of Northwestern 
University.  They petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for the right to unionize and  
collectively bargain.  Tom Farrey, Kain Colter Starts Union Movement, ESPN (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10363430/outside-lines-northwestern-wildcats-football-players-
trying-join-labor-union.  On August 17, 2015, the National Labor Relations Board declined to rule on 
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products of draft-quality athletes compared to actual compensation of S/A labor 
shows how the NCAA uses its cartel power to pay top performers less than their 
market values.  These results were suggested by Fleisher, Goff, Shughart & 
Tollison.11 The monopsony rents earned by the cartel are sizeable.  Estimates 
made by Brown12 and Brown & Jewell13 range from $500,000 to $1,000,000.14  
The NCAA exhibits so many “classic” cartel characteristics it is essentially 
a textbook case. Leeds & von Allmen use the NCAA as an example of a buying 
cartel in their intermediate theory text.15  Fleisher, Goff & Tollison point out the 
NCAA is subject to lumpy entry conditions.16  This creates a unique first mover 
problem (high start-up costs for the first school to break away from the cartel).  
Output monitoring by the cartel is described in Stigler,17 Fleisher et al.,18 and 
Fleisher, Goff & Tollison.19 Within the NCAA, the monitoring takes place with 
imperfect information; self-enforcement models with imperfect information 
were introduced by Spence20 and Green & Porter21 and updated by Tedeschi.22 
These models consider cartels in a repeated games context with homogeneous 
(as in Green & Porter) and differentiated (as in Tedeschi) outputs.23  Since cartel 
members cannot observe the moves of others perfectly, the optimal cartel  
                                                          
the petition.  Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 204 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001, 1088, 2015 WL 4882656, 
at *7 (Aug. 17, 2015).  
11. Arthur A. Fleisher III, Brian L. Goff, William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, Crime or 
Punishment? Enforcement of the NCAA Football Cartel, in SPORTOMETRICS 153, 154 (Brian L. Goff 
& Robert D. Tollison eds., 1st ed. 1990). 
12. Robert W. Brown, An Estimate of the Rent Generated by a Premium College Football Player, 
31 ECON. INQUIRY 671, 671–84 (1993). 
13. Robert W. Brown & R. Todd Jewell, Measuring Marginal Revenue Product in College  
Athletics: Updated Estimates, in ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE SPORTS 153, 153–62 (John Fizel & Rodney 
Fort eds., 2004); Robert W. Brown & R. Todd Jewell, The Marginal Revenue Product of a Women’s 
College Basketball Player, 45 INDUS. REL. 96, 96–101 (2006). 
14. Brown & Jewell, Measuring Marginal Revenue Product in College Athletics: Updated  
Estimates, supra note 13, at 96, 154 (citing Brown, supra note 12, at 679–81; Robert W. Brown,  
Measuring Cartel Rents in the College Basketball Player Recruitment Market, 26 APPLIED ECON. 27, 
32 (1994)). 
15. MICHAEL A. LEEDS & PETER VON ALLMEN, THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS 385–87 (5th ed. 2014). 
16. ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III, BRIAN L. GOFF & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, THE NATIONAL 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 123–32 (1992). 
17. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 46 (1964). 
18. Fleisher, Goff, Shughart & Tollison, supra note 11, at 157–62. 
19. FLEISHER, GOFF & TOLLISON, supra note 16, at 100–22. 
20. Michael Spence, Tacit Co-Ordination and Imperfect Information, 11 CAN. J. ECON. 490,  
490–505 (1978).  
21. Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price  
Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87, 87–100 (1984). 
22. Piero Tedeschi, Cartels with Homogeneous and Differentiated Products and Imperfect  
Monitoring, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 635, 635–56 (1994). 
23. Green & Porter, supra note 21, at 91; Tedeschi, supra note 22, at 643–47. 
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equilibrium cannot be maintained.  Humphreys & Ruseski developed a model 
of optimal “whistle-blowing” behavior in a self-monitoring cartel.24  This  
approach takes a basic model of tacit coordination and imperfect information by 
Spence and makes it dynamic with reaction lags.25  Without some sort of  
self-monitoring and enforcement, these models tell us the cartel will not survive 
in the long run.26 
If cheating on the cartel agreement is discovered, enforcement actions are 
taken.  These actions affect the competitive balance of the organization.  Depken 
& Wilson report the greater the level of enforcement in a conference, the better 
the competitive balance.27  However, they also find that as punishments increase 
in severity, competitive balance erodes.28  Using only observable variables 
available to all cartel members, Humphreys & Ruseski predict instances of 
cheating detection and punishment with reasonable success.29  Their approach 
reinforces earlier findings and suggests the stability of the cartel is important to 
its members.30   
Scholarship linking the behavior of the NCAA with the influence of the 
economics of crime is less prominent in the literature.  The papers in this area 
stem primarily from the work of Becker and Ehrlich.  Becker argues that  
scarcity causes rational economic agents to weigh the costs and benefits of legal 
and illegal behavior.31  He imagines a supply of offenses function that is heavily 
influenced by the probabilities of arrest and conviction, the expected  
punishment, and returns to other legal activities.32  Ehrlich also develops a  
supply of offenses function using a state preference approach in a one period 
uncertainty model.33  He suggests the opportunities available in legitimate  
activities are important for the would-be offender.34  Becker and Ehrlich present 
us with the rational crime model.  Both authors suggest crime and legal activities 
are not mutually exclusive; an optimal activity mix exists.35  This approach has 
been quite influential in the broad literature on criminal justice and has  
                                                          
24. See Brad R. Humphreys & Jane E. Ruseski, Monitoring Cartel Behavior and Stability: Evidence 
from NCAA Football, 75 S. ECON. J. 720, 720–35 (2009). 
25. Id. at 722, 724; see Spence, supra note 20. 
26. See Humphreys & Ruseski, supra note 24, at 733. 
27. Craig A. Depken II & Dennis P. Wilson, NCAA Enforcement and Competitive Balance in  
College Football, 72 S. ECON. J. 826, 843 (2006). 
28. Id. 
29. Humphreys & Ruseski, supra note 24, at 734. 
30. See id. at 733–34. 
31. Becker, supra note 1, at 207–09. 
32. Id. at 207. 
33. Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 533–37. 
34. Id. at 559–60. 
35. Becker, supra note 1, at 209; Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 523–24.  
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simultaneously shaped policy.36  Using this rational crime approach,  
McCormick & Tollison study enforcement effects on crime.37  Employing data 
from professional basketball, they find the supply of fouls is sensitive to the 
number of referees on the court.38  More enforcement results in less crime.39  
Since enforcement is not costless, efficiency requires that efforts to reduce 
|criminality should involve evaluation of both the benefits and costs of crime 
reduction.  
This investigation of NCAA behavior is influenced most by the economics 
of crime literature.  Cheating on NCAA amateurism rules can be modeled as a 
rational choice.  Detection and punishment of cartel cheating, thus, become  
necessary functions of the NCAA. 
III. THEORETICAL MODEL 
The production of sports entertainment (and winning percentages) requires 
S/A, other labor inputs, and the facilities and equipment associated with athletic 
competition.  The standard approach witnesses the firm making input decisions 
based on marginal benefits and marginal costs of employing the resource.  Let 
ρ represent winning percentages, R represent rents, and Ls/a represent  
student-athlete labor.  To maximize winning percentages, ρ, schools will  
compare the marginal revenue product (MRP) of S/A with the wage they must 
pay S/A.  Specifically, the MRP of the S/A is the increase in the win/loss record 
(the marginal product of S/A, δρ/δLs/a) multiplied by the increase in rents from 
the increase in the winning percentage (δR/δρ).  Thus, MRP S/A = 
(δρ/δLs/a)*(δR/δρ). 
In the absence of NCAA restrictions, schools will hire S/A so long as the 
MRP exceeds or is equal to the wage.  The higher the wage, the smaller the 
quantity of high-quality S/A demanded and vice versa.  This relationship is  
depicted in Figure 1 panel (a). It should be emphasized that the wage schools 
pay for S/A represents the legal payment as set forth in the NCAA Manual.  
NCAA rules reduce the payment to w1 and the cartel captures rents equal to the 
shaded area in panel (a) Figure 1. 
                                                          
36. Becker, supra note 1, has over thirteen thousand citations according to Google Scholar.   
Moreover, the rational crime model has inspired contemporary policy makers to rethink the criminal 
justice process.  See, e.g., Anne Milgram, Why Smart Statistics Are the Key to Fighting Crime, TED 
(Oct. 2013), http://www.ted.com/talks/anne_milgram_why_smart_statistics_are_the_key_to_fighting_ 
crime. 
37. Robert E. McCormick & Robert D. Tollison, Crime on the Court, 92 J. POL. ECON. 223,  
223–35 (1984). 
38. Id. at 229–30. 
39. See id. at 232–34. 
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In the same way, the schools will hire other labor inputs (coaches, trainers, 
etc.) so long as the MRP of each of these inputs exceeds or is equal to their 
respective prices.  If the markets for these other labor inputs are competitive, 
these resources are obtained through price competition, and no exploitation  
occurs.  Since NCAA rules prohibit schools from using price competition to 
attract S/A, schools resort to non-price competition.  In addition to the  
NCAA-sanctioned recruiting tools and offers (campus visits, scholarships,  
facilities, etc.), schools may also resort to non-sanctioned offers, which are  
recruiting violations.  These violations become part of the demand for S/A labor. 
Formally, the S/A demand function can be expressed as: DL = DL 
(GRANT, Pother, V, ρ)(1) where GRANT is the NCAA-sanctioned wage, Pother 
is the price of other inputs, ρ is the school’s winning percentage in the sport, 
and V are NCAA violations.  This input demand function is analogous to the 
conditional input-demand function found in the neoclassical theory of the firm.  
The demand is a function of input prices and the level of output.  As a  
neoclassical input demand function, we can expect the demand for higher  
quality S/A labor to exhibit the usual characteristics.  The demand will be an 
inverse function of the input’s own price, i.e., δDL/δGRANT < 0.  That is, as 
the value of the legal payment to athletes increases, the gap between it and the 
MRP declines.  Therefore, the potential rent declines.  With less rent available 
at the margin, the additional benefit from using one more unit of high-quality 
S/A labor diminishes.  Thus, DL decreases as GRANT increases; there is an 
inverse relation between quality S/A labor demanded and price.  Moreover, 
since violations are covert means of recruiting S/A, the demand will be inversely 
related to violations, of δDL/δV < 0.  The violations committed add to the total 
price of quality S/A labor, making it more expensive to obtain.  It is useful to 
consider GRANT as the explicit cost of S/A labor and V as the implicit cost.  
As the number of violations increases, then, the units of high-quality S/A labor 
demanded decreases.  The cross-price effects will be indeterminate, depending 
on whether the other inputs are substitutes or complements.  Finally, the demand 
for S/A labor will be an increasing function of the output (winning percentages) 
so that δDL/δρ is positive. 
The input demand function described above is simultaneously a production 
function for the school.  Since NCAA rules fix the number of athletes teams 
may use, fierce competition for better quality athletes arises.  Recruiting agents, 
acting on behalf of schools (specifically their athletic interests), supply  
violations and other inputs (such as facilities, past win/loss records, and a basic 
scholarship) to recruit more talented athletes.  Therefore, just as the production 
of sports entertainment creates a derived demand for quality S/A, the demand 
for S/A creates a willingness to supply, or produce, violations. 
 As mentioned, this treatment of the supply and demand for violations is 
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rooted in the economics of crime literature.40  In the pursuit of better win/loss 
records and the higher rents that success produces, schools have an incentive to 
cheat on the NCAA-sanctioned wage.  By cheating and offering star S/A cash 
or in-kind benefits exceeding the NCAA-defined legal maximum, the schools 
can obtain more talented athletes and increase their winning percentages and 
their economic rent.  Thus, the demand for S/A translates into a supply of  
violations as illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 1. 
An adaptation of John Stuart Mill’s reciprocal demand model is useful for 
illustrating this reciprocal relationship between demand and supply.  First,  
consider panel (a) in Figure 2.   The vertical axis represents varying qualities of 
S/A labor (with poorer quality labor near the origin and higher quality away 
from the origin).  The horizontal axis represents quantities of violations (V).  
The line OU indicates an athletic department’s willingness, ceteris paribus, to 
exchange NCAA rules violations for star athletes.  Other things equal, we can 
expect schools to commit more violations for more star athletes, i.e., OU will 
be upward sloping.  Moreover, neoclassical theory would predict a declining 
marginal willingness to cheat because the marginal product of S/A labor is  
subject to diminishing returns.  This behavior creates an increasing slope of OU. 
The line OP in Figure 2(b) indicates the terms of trade; it is the number of  
violations required to acquire a given quality of star athletes.  The flatter this 
line, the more expensive S/A labor is in terms of violations.  As the slope of OP 
increases, more star-quality S/A labor can be acquired for any given number of 
violations.  Take, for example, the amount of labor L0 s/a.  To acquire this 
amount of labor, a school must commit V, V’, or V” violations as the terms of 
trade move from OP, to OP’, or to OP.” 
The willingness-to-cheat curve, OU, can be used to derive a demand for S/A 
labor.  Additionally, a supply of violations curve can be derived from the same 
set of curves.  The school will select a combination of violations and S/A labor 
based on the terms of trade.  The equilibrium combination will be at the  
intersection of OU and OP.  Taking all alternative terms-of-trade (price) lines 
and finding the OP/OU intersections produce two sets of data: (1) a collection 
of price/labor quantity data, and (2) a collection of price/violations data.  This 
information can be translated to the conventional format found in panels (a) and 
(b) of Figure 3. 
The relative price of quality S/A labor in terms of violations is on the  
vertical axis of panel (a) in Figure 3 while the quality of S/A labor is on the 
horizontal axis.  The prices p, p’, and p” from Figure 2 panel (b) are transferred 
to the vertical axis in Figure 3(a).  For each of these prices, the quality of labor 
                                                          
40. A more traditional model might view the demand for cheating as emanating from the firm (i.e., 
cheating is just another input the firm demands to produce its output). 
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demanded is shown by the demand for S/A labor curves, DL.  Now, for each 
point on the curve DL, there are a corresponding number of violations produced 
to secure the desired quality of S/A labor.  Figure 3(b) illustrates the supply of 
violations function generated from the demand for quality S/A labor.  The  
demand function in panel (a) is equivalent to the supply of violations in Figure 
3(b). 
 The key to this simultaneous relationship is the effect the NCAA cartel has 
on the behavior of the school and its agents in the production of sports  
entertainment.  Because of the NCAA cartel, the school acts as a monopsonist 
in the labor market; this behavior is captured in the demand for S/A labor.  At 
the same time, the very existence of the cartel creates economic incentives for 
the schools to cheat on the sanctioned wage; this behavior is captured by the 
supply of violations.  Thus, producing sports entertainment involves engaging 
in a labor market that can, at the same time, be interpreted as a violations market.  
Consequently, the behavior of the schools can be studied from either  
perspective. 
Focusing on the violations market, the supply of violations defines the  
general willingness of schools to break NCAA rules.  The economics of crime 
literature indicates the willingness to break rules (or laws) will be influenced by 
the costs and benefits of cheating.  As the benefits of higher winning  
percentages rise, the willingness to cheat will also increase.  A higher marginal 
product of S/A labor will also increase the willingness to break rules as will 
increased monopsony power.  This latter influence reflects the higher marginal 
rents available from exploitation of S/A labor.  Sports with greater monopsony 
power (i.e., football and basketball) have the potential to earn higher rents from 
cheating.  The potential costs of cheating (i.e., forsaken television revenues) will 
deter violations as they increase.  Following the economics of crime literature, 
what matters are the expected costs: the penalty multiplied by the probability of 
punishment. Therefore, a supply of violations function can be formally  
presented as Vs = Vs (Pv, MKT, FINE, PROB, GRANT) (2), where Vs is the 
quantity of violations supplied; Pv is the price of violations; FINE is the cost of 
cheating (the NCAA-imposed sanctions); MKT is the degree of monopsony 
power; PROB represents the probability of being caught and punished; and 
GRANT represents the legally sanctioned wage the school must pay the S/A.  
From the preceding discussion, we would expect the following relations: 
δVs/δPv > 0, δVs/δMKT > 0, δVs/δFINE < 0, δVs/δPROB < 0, and 
δVs/δGRANT < 0.  
The price of violations, Pv, represents the marginal rent the school gains 
from cheating (the distance between the demand curve and w1 in panel (a) of 
Figure 1).  The gains from cheating are reflected by the marginal rent available 
to the team from supplying violations.  Therefore, the higher Pv is, the greater 
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is the supply of violations and vice versa.  Similarly, as monopsony power  
increases, the potential economic rents increase.  For this reason, the supply of 
violations also increases with increased market power.  Higher marginal costs 
of cheating discourage violations.  Increases in the probability of punishment 
and/or sanctions will reduce the supply of violations. 
On the input side, S/A are viewed as utility maximizers, where utility is a 
function of income.  The decision to supply labor can be viewed as a portfolio 
allocation problem, where the objective is to maximize: U = U(Yl, Yi)  and 
where utility, U, is a function of Yl, income earned from the selection of a  
college sports program, and Yi, income earned from alternative employment 
opportunities.  Neoclassical economic theory assumes the relationships between 
these variables are such that δU/δYl > 0, δ2U/δ(Yl )2 < 0, δU/δYi > 0, and 
δ2U/δ(Yi)2 < 0.  The income defined by Yl includes sanctioned offers and the 
extra benefits from illegal offers.  This utility maximization process results in a 
supply of labor function (implicit in this approach is the assumption S/A realize 
there are a limited number of positions per program and a large pool of  
applicants; it is the utility maximization of the most talented S/A that is captured 
here). Traditionally, the S/A will supply sports labor so long as she or he  
receives an in-kind (legal) or cash payment  (illegal) in excess of her or his 
opportunity cost.  Because the supply of labor depends in part upon the extra 
benefits from illegal offers, it follows the demand for violations (by S/A) is  
derived from the supply of labor decision. 
The relationship can be depicted as before using the reciprocal demand 
model.  Figure 4 shows the S/A side of the trade-offs illustrated in Figure 3.  In 
Figure 4, panel (a), the vertical and horizontal axes remain labeled as in Figure 
3(a).  Focusing on the supply of S/A labor and demand for violations, it is  
evident the flatter the line OA, the greater is the number of violations demanded 
to secure a given amount of S/A labor.  Also, for increasing quantities of labor 
along a given willingness-to-cheat curve, the quantity of violations demanded 
increases.  Thus, in Figure 4(b), a supply of S/A labor function is shown as SL 
and it is simultaneously equal to the demand for violations function, Dv, in  
Figure 4(c).  This demand for violations will exhibit the usual characteristics of 
neoclassical demand theory and the economics of crime literature.  
Formally, the demand for violations is defined as: Vd = Vd (Pv, GRANT, 
PROB)(3) where Pv is the price of violations, as described above; GRANT is 
the basic grant (legal offer) provided to athletes; and PROB is the probability of 
losing collegiate eligibility for violating NCAA rules.  Based on neoclassical 
demand theory and the economics of crime literature, we can expect: δVd/δPv 
< 0, δVd/δGRANT < 0,and δVd/δPROB < 0. 
The willingness of S/A to violate NCAA rules will be inversely related to 
the NCAA-sanctioned benefits and the probability of being punished.  The  
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product of these two variables represents the expected costs of crime.   
There is a relationship, then, between the price of violations and the  
willingness of schools to cheat.  As the price of violations rises, the schools’ 
willingness to cheat increases as well.  This is because the reward to the schools 
is rising.  The divergence between the MRP and the official wage is the result 
of monopsony power.  The greater the market power of the schools, the fewer 
the alternatives left to the S/A and, ceteris paribus, the less willing S/A will be 
to cheat.  Therefore, for larger deviations between MRP and the sanctioned 
wage, the S/A will require fewer violations.  Accordingly, for smaller marginal 
rents, more violations are demanded.  For larger marginal rents, fewer violations 
are demanded.   
S/A are utility maximizers and schools are rent maximizers.  The behavior 
of both participants can be described by the standard neoclassical theory of  
optimization.  From this activity, the traditional input demand and labor supply 
functions are derived.  The input demand and labor supply functions imply a 
supply of and demand for violations.   
Consider Figure 5, which brings Figures 2 through Figure 4 together in one 
set of graphs.  The curve OU in panel (a) defines the willingness to cheat in 
athletic programs.  The OU curve, as noted above, can be used to define both a 
demand for S/A labor curve and a supply of NCAA violations curve as  
illustrated in panels (b) and (c).  The OA curve in panel (a) shows the S/A  
willingness to trade S/A for violations.  This curve can be used to derive a S/A 
labor supply and a demand for violations, which are illustrated in panels (b) and 
(c) respectively.  The results of this process are two markets clearing  
simultaneously.  It is the intersection of the two willingness-to-cheat curves, 
which provides equilibria in the two markets. With the simultaneous nature of 
the two markets established, estimation of only one of the markets is necessary 
for analysis.  Thus, the following model deals exclusively with the violations 
market.   
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The empirical model consists of three endogenous variables and four  
exogenous variables: the quantity of violations supplied, Vs, the quantity of  
violations demanded, Vd, and the price of violations, Pv, and the costs of  
sanctions, FINE, the degree of market power exercised by the NCAA schools, 
MKT, the potential loss to S/A of NCAA sanctions, GRANT, and the  
probability of being punished, PROB.  The data includes 928 school violations 
observations from the period 1983–94.41  Observations for Vi are taken from 
                                                          
41. In 1994, the NCAA enforcement regime experienced a dramatic change.  Mandatory penalties 
for violations were eliminated and the organization switched to a “self-reporting” process for  
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the NCAA’s Enforcement Summary of Division I Schools.  Average annual 
professional salary data for each of the three sports serves as a proxy for S/A 
MRP while disaggregated scholarship expense data is used for the  
NCAA-sanctioned wage.  It is expected that Pv will be positively related to Vs 
and negatively related to Vd. 
The cost of sanctions, FINE, is measured as the marginal increase or  
decrease in television revenues earned by each school lagged one year. The 
method adopted follows that used in Fleisher, et al.  It is expected that schools 
coming off of a losing season will be more likely to cheat, suggesting an inverse 
relationship between FINE and Vs.  The market power variable, MKT, is  
captured by a ratio of graduation rates.  A value for the ratio greater than one 
signals relatively more monopsony power while values less than one signal  
relatively less monopsony power.  The relationship between MKT and Vs is 
expected to be positive.  The potential sanction faced by S/A, GRANT, is the 
average net present value of the basic grant multiplied by the number of S/A for 
each sport.  Finally, the probability of punishment, PROB, is estimated from the 
NCAA data on enforcement.  A ratio of punishments to estimated violations 
(weighted by the change in winning percentage from the previous year) serves 
as a proxy for this effect. Table 1 lists the variables employed in the model and 
their definitions.  Table 2 reports summary statistics on the data set. 
The original sample included the observations from NCAA Division I-A 
football, basketball, and baseball teams from the Atlantic Coast, Big East, Big 
West, Big Ten, and (then) Big 8 conferences.  Aggregating across sports may 
assume some type of administrative-level complicity that is unrealistic.  Yet, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that—although decisions may not be made jointly 
between the Athletic Director and the Administration—each agent certainly 
benefits from more success versus less success of athletic endeavors.  Consider 
the very recent case of the collaboration between ESPN and the University of 
Louisville.  A variety of news reports detail increased enrollments, a wider 
cross-section of student applications, and increased donations.42 Assuming  
linearity in the parameters, the model takes the form 
 
Vs = a01 + a11Pv + b11MKT + b21FINE + b31PROB + b41e1 
Vd = a02 + a12Pv + b52PROB + b62GRANT + e2 
                                                          
infractions.  Due to this regime change and the football conference realignments that occurred in the 
late 1990s, this study examines a period of relative stability in NCAA structure and enforcement  
routines. 
42. See, e.g., Steve Eder, Richard Sandomir & James Andrew Miller, At Louisville, Athletic Boom 
Is Rooted in ESPN Partnership, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013 
/08/26/sports/at-louisville-an-athletic-boom-made-for-and-by-tv.html?hpw&_r=1. 
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Vs - Vd = 0 
 
where Vs is the probability of supplying violations; Vd is the probability of  
demanding violations; aii are the coefficients for the endogenous variables; bii 
are the coefficients for the exogenous variables in each equation;  and e1 and e2 
are random error terms.  Due to the simultaneous system and the censored data, 
a nonlinear maximum likelihood estimation process (simultaneous Probit) was 
used.  Table 3 summarizes the results from this model.  
Of interest in Table 3 is the significance of the coefficients on PRICE, 
PROB, and GRANT in the supply equation, Vs.  PRICE and PROB have  
positive signs on their coefficients.  The sign on FINE is negative as expected 
but FINE is not significant in this sample. This could be due to the fact that the 
expected punishment is effectively zero for most programs. Although it is 
highly likely the data simply did not capture the impact properly, there is  
anecdotal evidence suggesting penalties are typically not high enough to change 
the behavior of cheating programs.43  A composite “penalty” variable was 
estimated as well (taking PROB multiplied by FINE); the coefficient was 
equally insignificant. GRANT is significant and of the expected sign. Results 
for FINE do not support the proposition that punishment deters crime in the 
NCAA.  The sign on MKT is negative and the effect is not significant.    
How meaningful are the estimated relationships in an economic sense?  One 
way to think about the impact of these relationships is to consider a one standard 
deviation increase in the exogenous variable and observe the resulting change 
on the dependent variable.  For example, if there is a one standard deviation in 
PRICE, what happens to the supply of violations, Vs?  Table 4 shows these 
impacts.  Clearly, for this sample, GRANT is most important in determining the 
overall level of violations, and PROB is not meaningful in an economic sense.  
For Vd, all the estimated coefficients are significant. The economic impact 
of these estimated relationships are also listed in Table 4 with similar  
magnitudes. On the demand side, the positive sign on PRICE is somewhat  
curious.  In the model, violations are supplied by schools and demanded by S/A.  
If violations are a “normal” good, we expect an inverse relationship between 
price and quantity demanded.  These results suggest S/A actually increase the 
violations demanded as the price increases.  Upon further reflection, this result 
may not be peculiar given the way price is measured.  The negative sign on 
GRANT tells us that students desire fewer violations the larger the grant-in-aid 
                                                          
43. Indeed, Oklahoma State University coach, Mike Gundy, said, in January 2015, the $8,500 fine 
from their violations case had zero impact on their program.  Bill Haisten, OSU's Mike Gundy Reacts 
to NCAA Penalty: ‘We Should Be Doing Cartwheels’, TULSA WORLD (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.tul-
saworld.com/sportsextra/osusportsextra/osu-s-mike-gundy-reacts-to-ncaa-penalty-we-should/arti-
cle_b9c34222-f267-56d1-aa73-7284018354d1.html. 
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offer is, other things the same.  Since PRICE is being measured as monopsony 
rent (using grant-in-aid in the calculation), there is likely an endogeneity issue 
with the demand specification.  Still, the empirical model of supply and demand 
suggests a “virtual” market for violations exists.  Put differently, the demand for 
S/A labor generates a supply of violations by member schools and the supply of 
S/A labor generates a demand for violations by the S/A themselves.  
In this market for violations, schools are first-movers.  As members of the 
NCAA cartel, they have the most to gain from cheating on amateurism rules and 
offering illegal incentives to S/A.  In order to investigate the robustness of the 
model on the supply side, a hybrid supply of violations was estimated using a 
Probit model with the addition of two interaction variables, PWRBB and 
PWRBK. These interaction terms were formed by multiplying the MKT  
variable by a dummy variable equal to 1 when a violation was recorded for a 
baseball program (PWRBB), and 0 otherwise, and a dummy variable equal to 1 
when a violation was recorded for a basketball program (PWRBK), and 0  
otherwise.44  These results are summarized in Table 5.  All the signs and  
magnitudes are robust to this model specification.  The additions of the  
interaction terms seem to aid in identifying the influence of relative market 
power on the supply of violations.  Other things the same, basketball programs 
“cheat” twice as often as baseball programs—a result the theoretical framework 
predicts. 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The results suggest a “virtual” market for violations exists.   The supply of 
violations is directly related to price and relative market power of the sports 
involved and inversely related to the basic grant-in-aid. The demand for  
violations is inversely related to the basic grant-in-aid.  Recently, the Power 
Five conferences (ACC, Big 12, Big Ten, Pac-12 and SEC) voted to allow  
payment of additional stipends to close the gap on cost of attendance.  This  
creates a natural experiment of sorts; the model here predicts that increased  
stipend should result in a decrease in violations, ceteris paribus.  Time will tell 
if this modest change to NCAA rules alters the behavior of cartel members and 
S/A.  
Since the supply of violations is equivalent to a demand for quality S/A, a 
simple change of labels allows for investigation of the “twin” parallel market 
(i.e., the demand for quality S/A labor).  Varying degrees of monopsony power 
affect the amount of cheating with the NCAA, thus information regarding the 
balance of market power within the cartel could lead to increased awareness of 
                                                          
44. The ratio of graduation rates used to measure the relative monopsony power, MKT, alone may 
be too noisy a signal.   
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potential violators.  For example, if a particular program appears to consistently 
attract top quality S/A, economic rents to the school should increase.  These 
rents will show up in the form of larger facilities, larger staffs and, of course, 
higher salaries.  The NCAA's enforcement team could create an index of “rents” 
earned and monitor the index for changes beyond some threshold level to signal 
potential recruiting violations.   
The reciprocal nature of the supply and demand for violations opens the 
door to another set of conversations about NCAA amateurism rules.  Because 
the supply of violations determinants can be reinterpreted as demand for S/A 
labor determinants, those interested in changing labor market conditions could 
find these results useful.  For example, if the Northwestern players do eventually 
succeed in forming a players union, how will the demand for S/A labor be  
affected?  Will cheating on NCAA rules increase if S/A are unionized?  In  
addition, there are clear benefits of estimating a market-clearing price or illegal 
offer in the violations market.  This information could be used to calibrate  
penalties for infractions, develop better enforcement tactics, and potentially  
predict the optimal amount of future grants-in-aid. 
 Cartels are (theoretically) unstable.  There is an opportunity cost involved 
in the detection and deterrence of cheating.  With better proxies for PROB, 
FINE, and MKT effects, a “forecast” for violations could be produced and a 
type of pro forma analysis for the NCAA would be possible.  Better information 
about cartel member behavior can only improve competitive balance and cartel 
stability.  By integrating the influence of the economics of crime models and 
the existing economics of sport and industrial organization studies of cartel  
behavior, this research contributes a new theoretical framework for studying the 
NCAA and other cartels—particularly those with monopoly power in the output 
market and monopsony power in the input market. 
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Table 1 Variable Names & Definitions 
PRICE S/A MRP – sanctioned wage is the natu-
ral log of (Avg. professional salary – 
avg. scholarship) 
 
V Qualitative variable equal to 1 if viola-
tion with enforced sanction occurred 0 
otherwise 
MKT Ratio of general population graduation 
rate to S/A graduation rate 
PROB Ratio of punishments to estimated viola-
tions (weighted by change in winning 
percentage from prior year) 
GRANT The natural log of the average net pre-
sent value of the basic scholarship multi-
plied by the number S/A for each sport 
(scaled) 
FINE Marginal increase or decrease in TV 
revenues earned by school lagged one 
year 
  
 
 
 
Table 2  Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
PRICE    4.49 1.22 8.32 1.94 
V            0.05 0 1 0.22 
MKT      0.702 0.0 1.68 0.34 
PROB    0.023 0.003 0.343 0.024 
GRANT 3.402 1.914 4.762 0.839 
FINE     -0.048 -9.35 9.104 2.005 
Data sources include:  NCAA Enforcement Summary, NCAA News, College Football 
U.S.A., Chronicle of Higher Education, World Almanac, NCAA Annual Reports and 
the Athletic Departments of various DI schools. N=928 
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Table 3 Z stats are reported in parentheses.  * =10%, **=5% ***=1% significance 
Variable Equation Vs Equation Vd 
Constant   -1.037 
 (-2.625)*** 
-1.232  
(-4.064)*** 
PRICE 0.108 
 (1.807)* 
0.096 
 (1.648)* 
GRANT -0.300 
 (-2.077)** 
-0.273 
 (-2.014)** 
PROB 3.001 
 (1.788)* 
2.95 
 (1.777)* 
MKT -0.239 
 (-1.092) 
Not a rhs variable 
FINE -0.003 
 (-0.086) 
Not a rhs variable 
Results from Simultaneous Probit model N=928  
 
 
Table 4 Impact of 1 standard deviation increase in significant variables Supply of Vio-
lations (Vs), (Vd) 
 (Vs) (Vd) 
PRICE 0.210 
 
0.186 
GRANT -0.252 0.229 
   
PROB -0.018 -0.071 
   
   
N=928   
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Table 5     Estimated models Supply of Violations,Vs, and Demand for Violations, Vd, 
  Z or t stats are reported in parenthesis 10%=* 5%=** 1%=*** 
(1) Variable (2)Vs Hybrid- (3)Vs Probit (4)Vd Probit 
PRICE 0.121 (1.891)* 0.108 (1.807)* 0.096 (1.648)* 
MKT n/a -0.239 (-1.092) Not a rhs variable 
FINE -0.002 (-0.05) -0.003 (-0.086) Not a rhs variable 
PROB 3.063 (1.819)* 3.001 (1.788)* 2.95 (1.777)* 
GRANT -0.369 (-1.883)* -0.300 (2.077)** -0.273 (-2.014)** 
PWRBB 
PWRBK 
0.728 (1.840)* 
1.447 (2.379)** 
n/a n/a 
 
 
Results from Probit model of a “hybrid” supply expression with baseball and basketball dummy variables 
are presented in Column (2).  Columns (3) and (4) are the original Probit results from Table 3 for  
comparison.   Additional information about the results is available from the author by request.               
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Figure 1 
The production of sports entertainment requires the use of S/A labor. The  
demand for this labor, Ds/a gives rise to the production of Violations, Vs 
  
HARRIS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  5:33 PM 
2016]  STUDENT-ATHLETE LABOR AND NCAA VIOLATIONS  429 
Figure 2 
The offer curve, OU, illustrates the willingness of a school to offer  
violations to secure better quality S/A. The rays, OP, OP’, OP” reflect the 
terms of trade between quality and violations. 
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Figure 3 
The demand for S/A labor results in the supply of violations. 
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Figure 4 
The offer curve, OA, reflects the willingness of a S/A to exchange labor 
for violations. As the offer curve rotates to the right, more violations are re-
quired to secure the same amount of quality labor. 
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Figure 5 
The intersection of the offer curves, OU and OA, defines an equilibrium in 
both the labor and violations market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
